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My purpose is to set the stage for subsequent sessions on the federal
role  in some  specific  natural resource  management  issues:  land  use,
soil and water conservation,  and water resources development. In each
of these areas,  resource  allocation decisions  are ultimately made by  a
myriad  of private  firms  and  individuals  (farmers,  real  estate devel-
opers, home buyers,  irrigators, and those active in the market for land
as  a  capital  asset).  These  decisions,  however,  are  influenced  by  the
rules and regulations, taxes, public works, and public investments that
emanate  from  the  various  branches  and  levels  of government.  Gov-
ernment  has  considerable  power  to  influence  the  course  of natural
resource  allocation and the well-being  of everyone who has a stake in
the way natural resources  are used,  developed and conserved.
The Role  of Government
It is  appropriate  to start by considering  the  role of government,  in
general,  before moving to the question of the federal role,  which  is at
least in part a matter  of jurisdiction among the levels  of government.
We briefly consider the implications of three models of the government
role,  two  of them  overtly  normative  and the  third  somewhat  more
descriptive  in orientation.
Normative  Models
a)  The Public  Interest, Market Failure Model
This is the  model which was presented  as the conventional  wisdom
in our formative years. It has a long intellectual  history. Public inter-
est  concepts  of government  are  rooted  in Rousseau's  version  of the
social contract.  The market failure economics  of Marshall  and  Pigou,
the compensation test logic of Hicks and Kaldor, and the social welfare
function concept of Bergson  and Samuelson helped to make the model
respectable  among economists.  With a considerable  assist from John
R.  Commons,  whose  institutionalism  was only  part-ways  compatible
with neo-classical  market failure conceptions, many of its basic prem-
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losing the momentum  it began to gather in the  1930s.
The basic  premises of the public  interest, market failure model are:
* The political perfectability  of man.  Once human beings are freed
from  essentially  evil  institutions,  and  granted  a  genuine  political
equality,  the influence  of pure selfishness will wane and the true pub-
lic interest will be revealed in the political  process.
* The basic problem  concerning government  is not so much to limit
its size and scope as to insure that it remains responsive to the public
interest. To promote the public interest over the interests of a powerful
but selfish  few,  some  considerable  regulation  of individual  activities
for the "public  health,  welfare,  safety,  and morals"  may be justified.
Programs  to promote  economic  activity,  to rectify market failure (i.e.,
to internalize  externalities  and to provide public goods and merit goods),
and  to promote  equality of economic  opportunity,  may  all  be seen as
enhancing  the general  welfare  and thus within the purview  of gov-
ernment.
* Continued  vigilance  and  effort are  necessary  to ensure that  gov-
ernment  remains responsive  to the public  interest.  A broad  array  of
legislatures,  committees,  courts,  and  tribunals,  and  an  increasingly
professional  and planning-oriented  civil service  are necessary,  to  en-
sure the continued dominance of public interests over private interests
in the political  sphere.
* Given that the  political  sector will reveal the  public interest, the
administrative  sector  must  adhere  to  an  ethos that  emphasizes  the
total submergence  of the manager's personal objectives in favor of the
politically-revealed  public interest and the objective,  scientific facts of
the situation. The managers are true professionals,  neither self-inter-
ested  nor politicized.  They seek  objective  facts  from researchers  and
educators,  who are  obliged to tell them  all the facts  and nothing but
the facts.  Thus armed,  the managers  allocate, invest,  and regulate  in
the public interest.
* A large and important role remains  for markets, but it is always
legitimate  for government  to second-guess market behaviors and out-
comes.  Fine-tuning  of market  behaviors  through taxation,  public  in-
vestment,  and regulation is perfectly legitimate  and often  desirable.
b)  Individualism and the Minimal  State
Recently,  a slightly older  normative model  of government has been
making a spirited comeback.  Under this model, all fundamental rights
are assigned to the individual. Government  is seen as a necessary evil:
necessary  only  because  the alternative,  anarchy,  is  even more  evil.
The basic  premises  of this model  may be listed:
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with  the individual.  To  avoid  anarchy,  individuals  would rationally
delegate  some rights to a central authority,  i.e., government.
*  The  citizens may  legitimately  resist  and  overthrow  any  govern-
ment which violates the public trust, that is, acts beyond its authority
legitimately derived from the people.  Following overthrow, a new gov-
ernment  must be installed.
* The rationale for the overthrow of governments which exceed their
authority  logically  implies strict  limits to the  authority  of any  gov-
ernment.  Individuals  are guaranteed  some  fundamental  rights and  a
government invading or denying these rights would exceed its rightful
authority.  Bills-of-rights  are the keystone  to a proper relationship be-
tween the individual  and governmental  authority.
* To the maximum extent feasible, the relationships  among individ-
uals  and between  the individual  and government  must be  governed
by the principal of Pareto-safety,  i.e., that change which damages any
individual  is ipso facto undesirable.  Thus the individualistic tradition
emphasizes  voluntary exchange  in the market,  and unanimity in the
political  sphere.  The cornerstone  of liberty is  a set of complete,  care-
fully specified,  secure,  enforceable,  and transferable rights.  The  allo-
cation of resources and the distribution of rewards are optimized under
a complete system of private property rights.
* The very concept of a public interest is greeted with deep suspicion.
The basic behavioral premise  is not the perfectability  of mankind but
unquenchable  human  selfishness.  Desirable  institutions,  therefore,  are
not those which appeal to behaviors  quite alien to human nature, but
those which get the most social mileage from purely  selfish behavior.
* The concept  of market  failure is greeted  with considerable  skep-
ticism.  In this  respect,  the research program  which  was initiated  by
the Journal  of Law and Economics a quarter century ago has enjoyed
considerable  success.  Market-like  behaviors  have  been  identified  in
many kinds of situations where markets were previously thought not
to exist.  It has been established  that externality  is  a fundamentally
trivial  concept:  externality  alone  cannot persist;  it can  persist  when
accompanied  by nonexclusiveness  and/or nonrivalry,  but these latter
two concepts  are  enough  to explain  the problem  without recourse  to
the concept  of externality.  Comparative  case  studies have  been com-
pleted, showing the superior performance  of organizational  structures
where rights are well defined at the individual level.
* Nonexclusiveness  and nonrivalry present persistent problems for
the individualists,  as does optimal taxation. The individualist solution
to just  about  every  problem  is  to  assign  exclusive  property  rights.
However,  there are  cases where  the costs of exclusions  are too  high,
or its ideological  connotations too offensive to make this solution work-
able.  In  such  cases,  individualists  tend  to fight  rear-guard  actions,
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onstrations  of cases in which markets  fail to  optimize are  simply not
conclusive: the case for a government  role can only be based on proof
that government would do better. For nonrivalry problems (i.e.,  public
goods), some progress has been made in defining incentive-compatible
mechanisms:  devices  which  simultaneously  determine  the  optimal
amount of a nonrival good and optimal individual taxes. This approach
is, of course, consistent with individualist  concepts of optimal taxation
derived from Wicksell  and Lindahl.
A Descriptive Model: The Diffuse Public Decision Process
Consider  a society of individuals,  seeking to  satisfy a variety  of di-
verse  objectives  by  allocating  their  endowments  according  to  maxi-
mizing principles.  This leads to  the diffuse model  of the  public policy
decision process,  the basic elements  of which are:
* There are many arenas in which conflicts may be resolved.  These
include the legislature,  the  executive  branch,  the judiciary,  and the
marketplace.
* Individuals  have  diverse  endowments  (including income, wealth,
property,  professional  reputations,  personal  standing  in the commu-
nity, native talent, acquired skills, and time) and seek to allocate these
across  the various  arenas  so  as  to  maximize  their  own  well-being.
Different endowments  are  differentially  effective  in different arenas.
Maximizing behavior includes both maximizing within the system and
maximizing  by  attempting  to  change  the  system.  Self-interested  be-
havior  includes  coalition  formation  in  those arenas where  collective
modes of choice  predominate.
* Even  those  who  operate  the various  public  decision  institutions
pursue their own  self-interest.  A basic  problem  for the design  of any
institution  is that of establishing  incentives  which  direct the efforts
of personnel toward  the institutional  objectives.
* Public decisions  are often not final in any ultimate sense. That is,
they can often be reversed  at some tolerable cost (notable exceptions,
of course,  include the irreversible  destruction of natural systems).  So,
those disappointed by a decision will often continue the battle, seeking
its reversal  in the same or different  arenas.
This model yields a variety of implications. It encourages some skep-
ticism about important  aspects  of the more  normative  models of gov-
ernment.  In  common  with  the  individualistic  model,  it  tends  to
undermine  the notion  of an identifiable  public interest.  On the other
hand, its emphasis on the  endogeneity of government tends to under-
mine the "government interference" rhetoric of individualists.  Finally,
it casts doubt  on the traditional  model  of the  proper relationship  be-
tween  the "decision  maker"  and  the  scientific  or technical  "expert".
Given the multiplicity of conflict resolution  arenas,  the  open process
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lack of finality in many decisions, and the wide range of self-interested
participants  in the  process,  the notion  of "the public  policy  decision
maker" loses its credibility.
This  model,  itself,  makes  few claims  of optimality.  Public interest
theorists tend to see their worst fears of the free play  of selfishness  in
government  fulfilled  in this  model.  Individualists  find little  comfort
in a process  in which selfish interests seek to form majority coalitions
in order to use coercive institutions  in ways  beneficial  to themselves.
The individualistic scholar James Buchanan,  for example, has recently
been  much concerned  with developing  the case  for  additional  consti-
tutional restraints on majority processes in government generally and
in taxation  issues in particular.
This diffuse model assigns a crucial role to information.  Information
is at once cognitive and  suggestive:  even the most innocuous "simple
fact", when incorporated  in a more general  model of the relevant sys-
tem and interpreted  in the light of an individual  goal structure  sug-
gests  a  course  of action  for  someone.  Information  comes  in  various
kinds and various qualities. Information is generated and released into
the system  and critiqued,  tested,  and evaluated by those who  receive
it.  It  may  be  attacked  by those  who  believe  it inaccurate,  but  also
those who consider it destructive to their own  objectives. Eventually,
that  information  which  survives  criticism  influences  the outcome  of
the public decision process.
In  sharp contrast to the  public interest  model - with its technical
experts  providing  objective,  factual  information,  on  demand,  to the
decision maker who decides in the public interest - the diffuse model
looks to open flows of information  and unrestrained critical  processes
for essential safeguards in a governmental  environment which is oth-
erwise  open to  abuse.
Researchers  and extension educators, according  to this model,  serve
a vital  public  role  in  generating  and disseminating  the information
which permits enlightened  pursuit of individual  and group self-inter-
est. A clear corollary  is the responsibility  of researchers  and extension
educators for promoting the openness of information channels and thus
reducing  the information  costs  facing  all the various  participants  in
the diffuse policy process.
The Federal Role
Adherents of the public  interest,  market failure model tend to pro-
mote  a  major  federal  role  in  natural  resource  management  on  the
following grounds:
* The logical basis of federation  implies that many public interests
are  in  fact national  interests.  Thus,  for  example,  the  disposition  of
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interest to  the national  public.
* Market failures such as air and water pollution, damage from sur-
face  mining,  and  even  the erosion  of farmland  soils  seldom  confine
themselves to state and local government boundaries. More often, they
manifest  themselves  in geographical  entities such as watersheds and
airsheds,  which have no respect  for political  subdivisions. Thus, these
kinds of market failures require  a national response.
*  State and  local governments  confronting  large and mobile  firms
are in a classic prisoner's dilemma. Without concerted and coordinated
action  by all governments  simultaneously,  large firms can effectively
play  off one regional  government  against  the  others,  by threatening
to relocate whenever  a local jurisdiction attempts to pursue the public
interest by taxing or regulating their activites.
* Many state and local governments,  with their hick legislators and
their small underpaid professional  staffs are no match for the interests
and the lobbyists. The federal government, it is claimed,  is in a much
better position  to defend the public against special  interests.
On  the other hand, philosophical  individualists  prefer in principle
not  only  to minimize  the  size  and  scope  of government  in total,  but
also to assign  each governmental  responsibility  to the smallest  unit
(in  geographical  and population  terms)  of government  that  can  pos-
sibly  handle  it.  If local  populations  are more  homogeneous  than the
national  population,  they reason,  individuals  are  more  likely in  ag-
gregate to find satisfaction in the outcome of local rather than national
democratic  processes.
They further argue that for  many reasons  - including  recent  im-
provements  in funding  and staffing  of state  and  local  governments,
and the salutary effects of Supreme Court decisions in the 1960s elim-
inating the disproportionate  influence of rural voters and opening the
democratic process to minorities - the old criticisms of state and local
government are no longer valid. State and local governments are seen
as sources not so much of weakness but of diversity, a highly desirable
commodity  in the eyes of individualists.
But,  Does  the Process  Work?
Listening to our public interest theorists  and  our philosophical  in-
dividualists,  we  hear that state and  local governments  are unable to
protect their citizens,  while federal governments  all too often serve as
devices through which distant do-gooders arrogantly impose their will
upon recalcitrant individuals  and communities.  After participating in
two years  of discussions  of surface  mining and  land use  issues,  as  a
member  of a National  Academy  of Sciences  committee,  the dilemma
became  all  too clear to  me.  Local  governments  had  failed  entirely  to
deal  with the  sometimes  drastic  damage  that strip mining  visits on
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had been spotty, at best. A considerable constituency existed for strong
federal regulation of surface mining and reclamation.  The federal Act
of 1977  was  passed and  signed  into  law.  It was a  long  and detailed
document,  aimed  principally at regulation through design standards.
A new  federal agency  was created and  instructed  to develop detailed
regulations  consistent  with the  legislation.  States  were  required  to
accept temporary  federal  authority  in surface mine regulation,  or to
forego  certain  sources  of federal  monies.  Eventually,  administration
would be turned over to those state governments which enacted  sim-
ilar legislation and demonstrated  a capacity to enforce it.
No one, it seemed,  was happy with the federal Act. Environmental-
ists fretted that certain provisions  were too lenient and that enforce-
ment  might  not be  adequate.  Mine  operators  found  the regulations
enormously  extensive  and detailed,  yet insufficiently  flexible to meet
the wide variety of local conditions under which coal is surface mined.
Much of the scientific and technical community was sympathetic with
their position.
In the committee's discussions,  I found  myself in an awkward  posi-
tion.  Dilemma  #1:  Could I support  the  basic  concepts  of the federal
Act? Individualism,  under the pre-existing  structure  of institutions,
seemed more nearly the problem than the solution.  But, would a reg-
ulatory approach at the national level  do better?
Dilemma #2:  What about the need for flexibility  to adapt mining
and reclamation  procedures  to  a  local  conditions?  As  an  economist
well-versed  in the problems of regulation in general and design stand-
ards in particular, it was difficult to defend the Act as written. On the
other hand,  the prevailing  notion  of flexibility seemed  to entail  local
mine operators appealing to an agency-established  committee  of tech-
nical experts for relief from particular  provisions of the  Act.
To  me  it seemed  like that  kind of arrangement  would lead  all too
often to one particular  group of local interests  appealing to Washing-
ton  for complicity  in selling  other groups of local  interests  down  the
river.  In other words,  I too was in favor of flexibility, buy my idea of
flexibility  involved  genuine  local  control  rather than distant groups
of experts  making judgments  with  respect  to local  conditions.  More-
over,  I was highly skeptical of the notion that local interests would be
unanimous about the need for flexibility to meet local conditions. More
likely, divergent  local interests would appeal to a central government
to give them what they want. There  was simply no incentive  for the
kind of negotiations,  at the local level, which would lead to a genuine
consensus  as to the need for local flexibility.
This,  more than anything,  seems  to  me  to  be  the missing link  in
natural  resources  policy.  Existing institutions  encourage  all partici-
pants in the diffuse public policy process to seek uncompensated change.
That is, participants  attempt  to form  coalitions sufficiently  powerful
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On  the other hand, the  single most desirable attribute  of the market
is that it is an instrument through which to pursue compensated  change.
Markets  promote  efficiency  not by taking  resources  from  the ineffi-
cient  and giving them to the efficient,  but by permitting the efficient
to acquire those resources simultaneously compensating the inefficent
for their  loss. The efficiency-inducing  change  occurs with the consent
of all parties.
Currently,  government  attempts  to influence  the allocation  of nat-
ural  resources  rely  on  taxation,  regulation,  public  investment,  and
ownership,  and management of those  resources.  All of these methods
present one or another interest group with at least the hope of getting
something  for nothing, while threatening others with uncompensated
injury.  I  feel strongly that there  is  a real need  for  ingenious innova-
tions  in  institutional  design,  of  a  type  which  would  encourage  the
building  of genuine  consensus  about  the disposition  of natural  and
environmental  resources through mechanisms  of compensated change.
Compensation not only brings losers into a genuine consensus for change,
but  also automatically  eliminates  many  proposals  for change,  which
are unable to generate benefits  sufficient to provide for compensation
of losers.
The  issue of the role for the federal  government  is  really the  more
general  issue of institutional  design.  Surely, there  is much to discuss
and to debate in the assignment of authority among federal, state, and
local governments.  Nevertheless,  in  many natural  resource  and  en-
vironmental  issues,  I  suspect  that  adequate  answers  will  never  be
found  if the question  is defined as  simply one  of authority and juris-
diction.
The institutional devices which our past history has bequeathed are
a  curious  admixture  of tools  appropriate  to the  public  interest  and
individualist  doctrines.  Not  only  are  both  of these  doctrines  inade-
quate,  but they  are mutually  inconsistent  in  many important  ways.
An ad hoc collection  of devices  from both traditions  offers little hope
of genuine progress beyond the point where we are now.  What is needed,
it  seems  to  me,  is  genuine  innovation  in  the  direction  of consensus
building devices  based on the notion  of compensated  change.
Scope  for Change
Compensated  change requires the vesting of some meaningful rights
in the status quo: some  kind of property  rights to be traded,  or some
right of consent to be withheld in the event that the proposed  change
(including its compensation provisions)  is unacceptable.  This much  is
thoroughly  individualistic.  However,  the pervasiveness  of nonexclu-
siveness  and nonrivalry  in natural resource  and environmental  man-
agement issues literally requires some kind of collective response. Can
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I think that might be possible.
It  would  seem  desirable  for such rights to  be  established simulta-
neously,  all  across  the  nation.  That  would  most  likely  involve  the
federal  government in establishing  such rights. Thereafter,  however,
the trading of local  rights or the withholding  of local consent would
be a purely local  decision.
While this kind of innovation would change the shape and perhaps
the size of government institutions, an important role for government
would  remain.  Beyond  the  initial assignment  of rights,  government
would  be needed  to ratify  and  enforce the status quo and any  subse-
quent agreements to reassign rights. Further, some aspects of the local
governing apparatus  may need to be expanded,  as more of the signif-
icant  decisions are negotiated  and resolved first within the local  com-
munity and then between the community and those (often "outsiders")
seeking  change.
Some  First Steps
As one watches the unfolding of developments  in the governmental
role in resource  and environmental  policy, one  observes various changes
which  are at least  somewhat  in the spirit promoted  here.  First steps
are usually  a little  tentative,  as  they were  for example,  in the  dere-
gulation  of interstate transportation.  Nevertheless,  if the example  of
commercial  aviation has any more general relevance, one may be hopeful
that the experience with first steps will provide positive reinforcement
for the institutional innovators.
In water  resources  development,  recent  emphasis  on user charges
and state and local cost-sharing is promising.  While cost-sharing pro-
posals  are  still  timid  (10  percent  cost-sharing  was  proposed  by the
Carter administration,  while a  figure of 35  percent  is receiving  dis-
cussion within  the  Reagan  administration)  and user  charges  do  not
always  cover  the  costs  of service,  these  proposals have the potential
to revolutionize  the politics of water. The old "something  for nothing"
atmosphere in which water resources developments were proposed seems
destined for  change.
The  "windfalls and wipe-outs"  atmosphere  which dominated public
decisions  about  land  use controls  can be  transformed  by markets in
development rights. The right of local  communities (in most states) to
control land use via zoning can be used to determine  which local geo-
graphic areas are to be subject to development.  The establishment and
subsequent transfer of development rights serves to distribute the pro-
ceeds from changes in land use among all landowners,  rewarding those
whose land is retained in desired current uses  as well as those whose
land changes use.  Again, this tends to transform the political atmos-
phere in which land use decisions  are made.
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pollution control  policy,  e.g.,  "offsets,  banks,  and bubbles",  have  con-
siderable potential for using market forces to gain efficiencies  and cost
savings in emissions control.  Permissable levels of total emissions are
set in traditional regulatory  processes (that,  too, could  conceivably  be
changed  given sufficiently  innovative  leadership),  but  offsets  permit
some  trading  of emission  control  responsibilities  among  established
polluters and new or expanding firms which might otherwise be denied
permission  to  operate;  banks  permit  intertemporal  trading  of emis-
sions control; and bubbles allow high-cost abaters to continue pollution
so long  as  nearby  low-cost  abaters  reduce  emissions  at least enough
to make up the difference.
Interestingly  enough, not all  of the innovation  in air pollution  con-
trol  is confined  to federal  agencies.  Jefferson  County,  KY  (which  in-
cludes Louisville and most of its suburbs), reacting to USEPA pressure
to  improve  ambient  air quality,  has proposed  a set of arrangements
which include some trading of pollution control responsibilities among
firms and sectors,  so as to permit concurrent  emissions reduction  and
economic  development.
Not all that  is  currently  happening  in natural  resource  and envi-
ronmental  policy is promising.  One looks in vain for a spirit of inno-
vation  in  soil  conservation  policy.  The  current  administration  has
surprised  some  by failing to make  more  rapid  progress  in the use  of
incentives  to  resolve  resource  and  environmental  conflicts.  The  cur-
rent emphasis  on  benefit  cost  analysis  of environmental  regulations
must be  viewed  with mixed  feelings.  In  some areas,  including  some
aspects  of pollution control  and the management  of public  lands, the
old pattern of coalition formation in pursuit of gains from uncompen-
sated change  continues:  only  the identities  of those in the ascendant
coalitions have  changed.
Nevertheless, the positive examples  I have mentioned, if viewed not
as isolated events but harbingers of more pervasive change, give some
basis for hope. Perhaps the old pattern of inconsistencies between pub-
lic interest  and individualistic  institutions  will eventually  be broken
by development of institutions which recognize the fundamentally col-
lective  nature  of many  resource  and  environmental  problems  while
pursuing the advantages  of trade  and compensated  change.
The  diffuse model  of the public  decision process,  with its emphasis
on  endogenous  government,  suggests  that  change  occurs  when  con-
vincing  arguments  for  change  coalesce  inchoate  individual  dissatis-
factions  into  majorities  supporting  innovate  proposals.  Professional
public  policy  educators  cannot  (and should  not)  control  this  process.
However,  by  clarifying the  issues and promoting  critical  questioning
attitudes, they can serve an important function in facilitating changes.
where traditional  procedures  are not satisfactory.
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